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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
RAMEENREY AMIRKHIZL 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20030639-CA 
ARGUMENT 
• I . 
THE EMTS VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
A. THIS ISSUE TURNSX)N CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. NOT FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The State's brief repeatedly contends that this Court should not address 
whether the EMT who searched Amirkhizi's backpack was a state actor subject to 
Fourth Amendment constraints, because Amirkhizi failed to acknowledge or 
marshall the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact reflecting that 
the EMT was a private actor. See State's brief at 7, 8,10,11, and 12. 
The "findings" which the State quotes in its brief actually do not appear in 
1 
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the "Finding of Fact" portion of the trial court's memorandum decision,1 but 
instead are included in the portion entitled "Discussion and Conclusions of Law." 
Compare State's brief at 10-11 (quoting purported findings without citation to the 
record), with 
Memorandum Decision at 4 (R. 52) (containing the "findings" quoted by the State 
in the Discussion and Conclusions of Law section). 
The facts of this case were neither disputed, nor in need of resolution by a 
fact finder, but were established by the preliminary hearing testimony of the 
State's witnesses (R. 88 at 1-30), and then further agreed upon by a stipulation of 
the parties (R. 32-35). 
The trial court was correct in addressing whether the EMT's search was 
subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the "Discussion and 
Conclusions of Law" segment of his memorandum decision, rather than in his 
findings of fact. Particularly when the underlying facts are not in dispute, the 
question of whether someone is a state actor who is subject to the constraints of 
the Fourth Amendment requires a court to draw legal conclusions, and presents a 
legal question, to be reviewed de novo. See, State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474, 477 
(UtahApp. 1991) (Court reviewed "conclusion of law" regarding whether search 
was private or subject to Fourth Amendment requirements for correctness and 
'See R. 49-51 (listing sixteen paragraphs of "Findings of Fact"). 
2 
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without deference). See also State v. Ellingsworth. 966 P.2d 1220 (Utah App.) (in 
assessing whether search was subject to Fourth Amendment strictures, Court 
analyzed legal questions without any apparent deference to the lower court), cert, 
denied. 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999); State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219,1220-23 (Utah 
1988) (same). 
Because of the State's significant and repeated mischaracterizations of the 
trial court's legal conclusions as findings of fact, and because of the State's failure 
to cite to the record in quoting the purported "findings of fact," this Court may opt 
to strike or disregard the State's brief or arguments. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (7) 
("All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported 
by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule."); Utah R. 
App. P. 24(e) (detailing how parties must cite to the record); Utah R. App. P. 24(j) 
(permitting Court to strike inaccurate briefs and require offending party to pay 
attorney fees). See, also. Koulis v. Standard Oil Company of California. 746 P.2d 
1182,1185 (Utah App. 1987) (Court disregarded appellate brief in part because 
the arguments were inaccurate); State ex rel A.G.. 2001 UT App 87,«[ 8, 27 P.3d 
562 (Court may refuse to consider briefs which fail to cite to the record), cert. 
denied, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001). 
At a minimum, the Court should reject the State's contention that 
Amirkhizi's purported failure to marshall the evidence in support of the purported 
3 
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findings of fact obviates the need to address whether the EMTs search was subject 
to the Fourth Amendment, because the issue turns on legal conclusions which do 
not require marshalling, but instead require de novo review. See Koury. supra. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EMT WAS NOT 
SUBJECT TO FOURTH AMENDMENT STRICTURES. 
The State makes its argument that the trial court correctly "found" that the 
EMT did not act with law enforcement intent in a footnote, stating: 
The EMT testified that he opened the pill bottle because he was 
dealing with a wreck of unknown cause and wondered whether 
defendant had taken some medication that he hadn't told the EMTs 
about. R. 88:13. After seeing what he believed were drugs, he was 
"a little concerned about what else might be in the pack," such as 
more drugs or even weapons. R. 88:15. Consequently, he opened 
another pocket of the backpack^ where he found two syringes. R. 
88:5. 
Upon finding the pills and syringes, the EMT told the nurse 
what he had found "to kind of give him a heads up to be a little more 
cautious with the patient and maybe give him a line of questioning to 
talk to the patient about what was in the pack." R. 88: 6. The EMT 
testified that he did not see himself functioning as an investigator: 
"my point then was to just pass on the information to [law 
enforcement officers] and let them do their job." R. 88:19. 
State's brief at 12 n.2. 
The State's footnote overlooks the trial court's primary legal conclusion 
regarding the EMTs intent: "His intent was proper and was to determine if 
defendant had anything that may have contributed to the single-car accident or 
that may be important in treatment." (R. 52). Discovering whether Amirkhizi 
4 
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had anything that may have contributed to the accident had nothing to do with 
emergency medical treatment, and was not a proper independent, non-
governmental purpose. Rather, it was an investigatory intent that should have 
brought the EMTs actions under Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See Michigan v. 
Tvler. 436 U.S. 499, 504-506 (1978) (firefighters who returned to the scene of a 
fire to collect evidence of the cause of the fire without a warrant violated the 
Fourth Amendment). 
The State's footnote contains many of the key facts pointing to a conclusion 
that the EMT was acting as an adjunct law enforcement officer who should have 
complied with the Fourth Amendment/ The EMTs opening of a pill bottle (T. 13) 
told the EMT nothing about whether Amirkhizi had taken anything he had not 
told the EMTs about, but was investigatory. The EMTs feeling a little concerned 
about what else was in the pack, perhaps drugs or weapons ), once again 
had nothing to do with providing emergency medical services, but was 
investigatory. His desires to direct the nurse's "line of questioning" (T. 6) to 
account for what he had found in the pack, and his view of his job as serving as a 
conduit of evidence to the police (T. 19) likewise demonstrates his investigatory 
intent and purposes. 
The State's footnote overlooks the primary facts which together compel the 
conclusion that the EMTs search was a law enforcement search or was motivated 
5. 
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by a desire to aid law enforcement: the EMT was a government employee (T. 2, 
10-11, finding of fact 1 (R. 49)), whose job training included "drug detection from 
Wyoming law enforcement authorities^ the Department of Criminal Investigations 
and a strike force] as part of his EMT responsibiUties" (finding of fact 9 (R. 50), T. 
7,17), and who had been encouraged by the police to routinely collect evidence 
for their criminal cases (T. 18). When the EMT found the contraband in this case, 
he did nothing to identify the apparent drugs or to ascertain if Amirkhizi had 
taken any of them, but instead passed on unspecified information to the nurse to 
"kind of give him a heads up to be a little more cautious with the patient and 
maybe give him a line of questioning to talk to the patient about what was in the 
pack." (T. 6). He viewed it as his job to pass evidence to the police in this case (T. 
1 9 ) ,- : , . • / • 
In short, the EMT was a law enforcement officer, or a government officer 
acting with an investigative and administrative purpose to aid law enforcement, 
who had no business conducting a warrantless search of Amirkhizi's backpack. 
See United States v. Shareef. 100 F.3d 1491,1502-03 (10th Cir. 1996) (police Cl 
dispatchers subject to Fourth Amendment, because they are adjuncts to law 
enforcement officers and "engaged in the often competitive exercise of ferreting , 
out crime."). 
All fruits of his illegal search must be suppressed. See, e.g.. Wong Sun v. 
i 
6 
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United States. 371 U.S. 471. 484-88 (1963).. 
. : - . . • • n . . - : " ' 
THE TROOPER'S VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
REQUIRES SUPPRESSION. > 
A. THE SEARCH OF AMIRKHIZI'S BACKPACK IS NOT PROPERLY 
CHARACTERIZED AS INCIDENT TO ARREST. 
The State is correct that: a warrantless search may be justified as a search 
incident to arrest if three factors are present: the arrest must be supported by 
probable cause, the search must be within the area of the arrestee's immediate 
control, and "'the search cannot be remote in time or place from the arrest.'" State 
v. Chansamone. 2003 UT App 107, «I«111 and 16, 69 P.3d 293; Michigan v. 
DeFillippo. 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979). 
1. THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUSTAIN THE ARREST. 
In order to establish probable cause to sustain a search incident theory, the 
State must show both the reliability of the EMT/informant's tip, and police 
observations giving rise to a reasonable belief that Amirkhizi had committed an 
offense or that evidence of a crime would be found in the backpack. See, e.g.. 
State v. Chansamone. 2003 UT App 107, "111. 
The State's probable cause argument is premised on the allegations of the 
EMT to the trooper, which the State contends are entided to a presumption of 
reliability because the EMT had nothing to gain by making them, on Amirkhizi's 
unspecified drug history relayed by a police officer, and based on Amirkhizi's 
7 
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refusal to allow a police officer to take his backpack. State's brief at 18-19. 
Assuming arguendo that the EMT is properly characterized as an ordinary 
citizen informant, what he saw in Amirkhizi's backpack - unidentified white 
powder and syringes in unspecified condition (T. 15) -d id not give rise to 
probable cause that a crime had been committed. As the EMT conceded, the 
white powder "could have been anything." (T. 15). See State v. Presley. 46 P.3d 
212, 214 (Ore. App. 2002) (afn^ming trial court's finding that officer did not have 
probable cause to believe that white powder in plastic bag was an illegal 
substance). Compare Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 742-43 (1983) (officer had 
probable cause to believe that balloon held illegal substance, because of officer's 
experience and police chemist's corroborative testimony that illegal drugs were 
frequently packaged in balloons tied in the same manner as the balloon in 
question, and because the suspect's glove compartment contained other evidence 
of involvement in possession of illegal substances); Chansamone, 2003 UT App 
107 *[ 2 (probable cause present on these facts: bouncer in a bar watched 
Chansamone go to the bathroom three or four times in an hour, and then found 
Chansamone standing in a bathroom stall with another man, holding and looking 
at a "baggie with some white stuff in it;" when police officer entered the 
bathroom, Chansamone repeatedly pretended to vomit, while insistently reaching 
for one of his pockets). 
8 
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The police observations proffered by the State are insufficient to establish 
probable cause. The fact that Amirkhizi had some unspecified drug history at 
some unspecified point in time did nothing to establish a reasonable belief that a 
crime had been committed on the date of the search. See State v. Brooks. 849 
P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App.) ("Brooks's criminal record also does nothing to 
establish that he is currently dealing in controlled substances, particularly since his 
most recent arrest was in 1988, at least two years prior to the events in the case at 
bar."), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). Cf. State v. Vigh. 871 P.2d 1030, 
1033 (Utah App. 1994) (Court excised stale drug histoiy limn search warrant 
affidavit in assessing probable cause). 
The fact that Amirkhizi was unwilling to let a police officer take his 
backpack does not contribute to probable cause, because people in this country are 
entided to avoid the police entirely with* laving adverse inferences drawn 
against them. See, e^ State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 493-94 (Utah App. 1990) 
(adverse inferences may not be drawn from desire to avoid contact with police)} 
2. THE SEARCH WAS NOT WITHIN THE AREA OF AMIRKHIZFS IMMEDIATE 
CONTROL. 
2Other elements of the Talbot decision have been overruled or called into 
question. 
In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1134 n.3 (Utah 1994), the court cited 
Talbot and several other cases in obviating the pretext doctrine as a basis for 
suppression in most Fourth Amendment contexts. 
In State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah), the court cited Talbot in a 
discussion of areas of confusion in Utah law on standards of appellate review. 
9 
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The State argues that the search of the backpack was within the area of 
Amirkhizi's immediate control because Amirkhizi and the backpack were both 
within the ambulance. State's brief at 20. The State also argues, "Even if 
defendant was strapped to the gurney, that factor, though relevant, is not 
dispositive." State's brief at 20. " 
The record demonstrates that Amirkhizi was "immobilized" on a backboard 
and on a gurney, and that his backpack was between the driver's seats in the 
ambulance at the time of the EMTs search (T. 4, 12). 
When Trooper Davis searched the backpack, however, contrary to the 
State's representation that the backpack was in the interior of the ambulance, 
State's brief at 20, the backpack was on the hood of a patrol car behind the 
ambulance (T. 21), because the Trooper had removed it from the ambulance (R. 
40). See Utah R. App. P. 24(j); Koulis. supra, permitting Court to strike briefs for 
inaccurate arguments. 
Because the backpack was not accessible to Amirkhizi at the time of the 
search (T. 21) when he was strapped to a backboard on a gurney inside an 
ambulance (T. 4,12) and the backpack was outside the ambulance on a police 
patrol car (T. 21), because there were at least three police officers present and 
only one suspect (T. 2, R. 39), and because there was no danger that Amirkhizi 
might obtain a weapon or evidence from the backpack, the search incident to 
10 
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arrest theory does not apply. See, State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 979 (Utah App. 
1998) (whether search is properly characterized as incident to arrest requires 
review of totality of circumstances and consideration of whether the arrestee was 
restrained; the relative positions of the officer, the defendant and the place 
searched; the accessibility of the item searched; and the relative numbers of .police 
and suspects); State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 391 (Utah App.) (same), afPd. 939 
P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997). 
3. THE SEARCH WAS REMOTE IN TIME AND PLACE FROM THE ARREST. 
With regard to the proximity of Trooper Davis' search and Amirkhizi's 
arrest, the State argues, 
The most reasonable reading of Trooper Davis's testimony and 
the parties' stipulation is that he arrested defendant at the scene of 
the accident shortly after finding the drugs. Nothing in the record 
supports defendant's speculation that the arrest may have occurred at 
the hospital or after defendant's release from the hospital, nor does 
he suggest why, having found the drugs, Trooper Davis would not 
have arrested the defendant on the spot. 
State's brief at 21. 
This argument conflicts with the representations of the trial prosecutor to 
the trial court, which were as follows: 
In the present case, the trooper did not immediately arrest the 
defendant, inasmuch as the defendant was in the process of receiving 
medical care. However, a formal arrest warrant was prepared as 
soon as practicable after the defendant was removed to the hospital. 
(R.44). 
11 
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It is axiomatic that the State has the burden to justify warrandess searches 
in the trial courts, and that when the State on appeal presents new alternative 
theories and new and different facts to meet its Fourth Amendment burdens, the 
Court need not consider the arguments. See State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 885-
87 (Utah App. 1990) (State not permitted to raise Fourth Amendment standing for 
the first time on appeal as an alternative basis for affirming the trial court's denial 
of a motion to suppress, because State must raise standing issue in the trial court 
as part of its constitutional burden to justify warrandess search), cert, denied. 800 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990);3 id- (citing Steagald v. United States. 451 U.S. 204, 209 
(1981), for the proposition that the government may lose the right to raise Fourth 
Amendment theories as alternative bases for affirmance on appeal, if the 
government asserted facts before the trial court which are contrary to those raised 
onappeal). 
Because the government cannot meet its constitutional burden to sustain 
Trooper Davis's warrandess search of Amirkhizi's backpack as a search incident 
3Other elements of the Marshall decision have been overruled 6r called into 
question. 
In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1134 n.3 (Utah 1994), the court cited 
Marshall and several other cases in obviating the pretext doctrine as a basis for 
suppression in most Fourth Amendment contexts. 
In State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, fl44, 37 P.3d 1073, the court noted that the 
standard for assessing the constitutional voluntariness of a defendant's 
statements applied in Marshall and several other cases had been superseded. 
12 
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and proximate in time and location to the arrest with accurate citations to the 
record, the Court should disregard the State's argument and/or strike its brief. 
See Utah R. App. P. 24(j), Koulis. supra. 
m . ;•• 
THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURTS 
CONCLUSION THAT THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE 
SALVAGES THE FRUITS OF THE UNLAWFUL SEARCHES 
FROM THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
In its third point of the brief, the State argues that this Court need not 
address the inevitable discovery doctrine, because the search incident to arrest 
theory '"is more readily supported by the record and fully consistent with the trial 
court's ruling.'" State's brief at 22, citing Chansamone. 2003 UT App 107 at«[ 10. 
In this argument, the State expresses puzzlement that the trial court did not 
characterize Trooper Davis's search of Amirkhizi's backpack as a search incident to 
arrest, and proffers the explanation that the trial court may not have understood 
that a search incident to arrest can precede an arrest. State's brief at 22. 
The State's puzzle is perhaps solved by the piece missing from the State's 
brief - the trial prosecutor essentially conceded before the trial court that the facts 
did not support a search incident tp. arrest theory with regard to Trooper Davis's 
actual search of the backpack, and argued that the contents of the backpack would 
have been inevitably discovered in the course of a hypothetical search incident to 
arrest premised on the EMTs statements or a subsequent search of Amirkhizi's car. 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The prosecutor's memorandum to the trial court states: 
While time is a significant component in these cases, the 
instant issue presents a unique situation. In the present case, the 
trooper did not immediately arrest the defendant, inasmuch as the 
defendant was in the process of receiving medical care. However, a 
formal arrest warrant was prepared as soon as practicable after the 
defendant was removed to the hospital. 
Moreover, in the present case, the evidence establishes that it 
was not Trooper Davis's intention to let the defendant's backpack 
leave his control once he learned there were suspected drugs 
contained therein. The State asserts the trooper would have 
discovered the drugs in the course of a search incident to arrest, 
either based on [the EMTs] statements or the eventual discovery of 
the additional contraband between the seats and the safe box. 
(R.44). 
Because the State did not propose the search incident to arrest theory 
asserted on appeal in the trial court, and asserted facts in the trial court which are 
contrary to those now asserted on appeal without citation to the record, this Court 
need not address the State's search incident to arrest theory on appeal. See, e.g.. 
Marshall. Koulis, supra. 
Because the State has not refuted Amirkhizi's correct argument that the trial 
court erred in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to salvage the fruits of the 
unlawful searches from the exclusionary rule, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's actual ruling relying on the inevitable discovery theory. See AmirkhizFs 
opening brief at 19-26. 
Conclusion 
14 
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This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying Amirkhizi's motion 
to suppress and remand this matter to the trial court for nullification of 
Amirkhizi's conditional plea and dismissal of the case. 
DATED this ? day of AdM/^ , 2004. 
LONIF/DeLAND 
Lawyer for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Appellant were hand-delivered or mailed on the I day of diM^U 
__, 2004 to: 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854. 
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